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C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 000981

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [GV](#) [UV](#)

SUBJECT: FRENCH PRESS COMPAORE ON GUINEA

REF: OUAGADOUGOU 949

Classified By: Classified by CDA Samuel C. Laeuchli for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary

41. (C/NF) Frenn Presidential Advisor for Africa Andre Parant met with President Compaore to press him on Guinea. Parant made the case that Dadis has to go, but Compaore argued that dialogue was the way to proceed and that Dadis might yet play a role in a transitional structure leading to elections. Compaore insisted on continuing to pursue dialogue and threatened to abandon the process if the opposition refused to deal with Dadis. Additionally, Parant pushed the idea of a mixed ECOWAS force to oversee the transitional period. Compaore was apparently receptive to such an idea. End Summary.

Pressing for Dadis to Depart

12. (C/NF) Charge met November 3rd with French Presidential advisor for Africa Andre Parant to get a readout of his meeting with President Compaore. Parant had come to Burkina Faso to get a better sense of how Compaore was proceeding with this mediation efforts in Guinea and to make the French position on what needs to happen next clear to the President.

13. (C/NF) Parant said that President Compaore was working on a scenario that was different from what the French had hoped. Compaore said that he imagined a transitional structure that could include the participation of Dadis. The structure would be a military President, a civilian First Vice President, a military Second Vice President and a civilian as Prime Minister. Dadis might or might not stay on as President in this scenario. Such a transitional structure would have to be balanced between civilians and military and between the various ethnic groups.

Forces Vives Response Crucial

14. (C/NF) According to Parant, Compaore left it ambiguous whether he felt Dadis would leave, but seemed to imply that he could well stay on. When Parant pointed out that the Forces Vives had refused to accept the possibility that Dadis would stay on, Compaore replied that he thought it would be easier to get them to accept a transitional structure that would include Dadis than it would be to get Dadis to relinquish power. When Parant argued that some type of exit strategy needed to be arranged for Dadis involving safe haven in another country, Compaore replied that he was very skeptical that Dadis would accept such an offer.

15. (C/NF) Compaore was scheduled to meet with representatives of the Guinean opposition later in the day, and promised to let Parant know whether they would be willing to consider the possibility of Dadis participating in the transition. As an aside, Parant did say to the Charge that if the Forces Vives would agree to the possibility of having Dadis participate in the transition or the negotiations leading to a transitional structure, then it would be very difficult to be "more Guinean than the Guineans." It would be hard for France and the U.S. to insist on Dadis leaving if the Guinean opposition ceased to do so, an outcome Parant did not believe was likely.

16. (C/NF) Parant asked Compoare what he would do if the opposition refused to deal with Dadis. The President's reply was that his mediation would fail and he would abandon his efforts. Parant did not believe that Compoare was really serious about this threat, but nonetheless was concerned that Compoare does not appear to be ready to push hard on Dadis to get him to leave.

ECOWAS Observation Force

¶ 7. (C/NF) During their meeting, Parant also pressed the idea of an ECOWAS observation force for the transition period. This force would be similar to what had been deployed for the 2007 elections in Togo, and would include both civilians and military. Compaore replied that this was an interesting idea⁸ and said he would consider it.

18 (C/NF) According to Parant, Compaore said that there was a need for dialogue with various elements of the military. He also stressed that they had to reach out to structures and professionalize the military. Parant told him that foreign donors could help with that process. He also pointed out to the Charge that any deal struck with Dadis, and even a successful transition ending with reasonable elections, could be undone by the military if it was not brought on board.

Comment

19. (C/NF) Parant appeared somewhat frustrated with his

meeting. He said that France, the EU and the US all agreed on the need for Dadis to leave the scene, but the international mediator has a different approach and that makes the way forward difficult. Our view is that Compaore does indeed have a different approach to ours, but in the end may prove flexible if the situation on the ground so dictates. Compaore is also proud of his role as mediator and of his independence from international, and particularly French, pressure. He knows that we want Dadis gone and that we want an ECOWAS force for Guinea. We need to keep passing the message of where we want the process to go, and he will certainly view that as a major factor as he moves forward. He is not seeking an outcome that will alienate the major powers and donors to his country.

110. (U) Conakry Minimize Considered.

LAEUCHLI